High-speed Rail in the United States: An Original Model of Establishment and Development by Schorung, Matthieu
HAL Id: hal-02098144
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02098144
Submitted on 12 Apr 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
High-speed Rail in the United States: An Original
Model of Establishment and Development
Matthieu Schorung
To cite this version:
Matthieu Schorung. High-speed Rail in the United States: An Original Model of Establishment and
Development. International Congress on High-Speed Rail. Technologies and Long Term Impacts, Oct
2017, Ciudad Real, Spain. ￿hal-02098144￿
 
 
 
 
High-speed rail in the United States: an original model of establishment and development  
 
Schorung, Matthieu 
PhD Candidate in Geography 
Université Paris-Est, France 
Laboratoire Ville Mobilité Transport, UMR T 9403 
matthieu.schorung@gmail.com  
 
 
 
Abstract 
Today, there are no high-speed lines in the United States according to the International Union 
of Railways’ standards, but one higher-speed rail example in the Northeast corridor. Several 
resounding failures occurred in succession in the 1980s and 1990s in Texas, in Florida and in 
Ohio. The “Obamarail” initiative in 2009 and 2010 gave a new momentum with additional 
funding dedicated to this new means of transport associated with concrete state commitments, 
with, however, variable levels of commitment. At the end of President Obama’s second term, 
the efficiency of these initiatives as well as the reality of high-speed rail in the US are worth 
studying. In 2016, the only project under construction lies in California. Other states started 
modernizing the existing networks as well as improving Amtrak services, although private 
projects are under development in parallel. Most projects at hand are not high-speed rail strictly 
speaking. This article suggests reviewing the Obama administration’s initiative in favor of high-
speed rail from 2009 and examining the political and territorial difficulties at various institutional 
levels. This analysis will enable us to develop a reflection on the high-speed rail model in the US 
as well as on the political and territorial lessons to be learned of this federal initiative.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the middle of the XXth century, passenger rail transportation has experienced an 
unprecedented crisis in the United States due to a lack of adaptation to new demand constraints 
and to the competition of new modes of transport. In 1970, the federal government decided to 
separate freight and passenger activities to relieve private rail companies, and to confide in 
Amtrak to take the responsibility and the monopoly of interurban passenger rail transportation. 
Since its creation, Amtrak has experienced heavy difficulties and has been in chronic deficit 
subjected to successive reforms. Despite structural handicaps which burden Amtrak’s financial 
health, and a lack of political commitment which hinders its capacity of investment, Amtrak has 
registered since almost two decades a record for ridership and revenue – from 20.9 million 
passengers in 2000 to 30.8 million in 2015. This mode knows a form of revival although its total 
modal part in interurban passenger transport – 0.2% – remains very modest.  
In parallel with existing rail services, this rail revival involves the establishment of high-speed rail 
in the United States. There is currently no high-speed lines in this country according to the 
standards of the UIC (Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer), but a single higher-speed line 
in the Northeast corridor. Several resounding failures followed one another in the 1980s and the 
1990s in Texas, in Florida or in Ohio.  The initiative in favor of high-speed rail in the United States 
of the Obama administration in 2009-2010 – called the “Obamarail” – reinvigorated this new 
mode of transport thanks to dedicated funds and a strong political commitment of some States 
and the federal government. At the end of the second term of President Obama, the question is 
whether the “Obamarail” has proven its efficiency and some concrete results. In 2016, only the 
Californian project of a new high-speed network is actually in progress. Other States are 
committed in the modernization of their existing rail network and the improvement of their rail 
services while private projects are developed through the country. The study of these various 
projects reveals a growing diversification of the technical, political and financial arrangements 
based on three trends: the adaptation of the existing network, higher-speed rail and true HSR.  
Most projects do not qualify for true high-speed rail strictly speaking. Indeed, the HSR model – 
more than 300 kph and requiring a dedicated infrastructure – does not seem adapted to the 
American context. After reminding the main legislative steps relative to HSR and establishing an 
assessment of the Obama administration’s initiative, the main projects in the United States 
should be analyzed including private ones. This analysis will allow to elaborate a reflection on 
the HSR model developed in the United States, and on the political and territorial lessons to be 
learned from this federal initiative.  
 
 
2. State of the art 
 
This reflection leads us to identify the bottlenecks which prevent the development of an 
ambitious rail policy, and then to consider the economic model of high-speed rail and its real or 
supposed competitive advantages against air transport or interurban coaches. Numerous 
proposals – emanating from every type of actors – aim at restructuring or at strengthening the 
offer of rail transport. The most committed lobbies plead for a comprehensive true high-speed 
network by 2050. Several potential solutions are considered such as the preservation of the 
national network with adequate funds, a more important devolvement to States and local actors 
or a massive investment program intended for the modernization of the existing network and 
for the building of new high-speed lines. The profusion of reflections and debates about rail 
transportation – HSR in particular – supports the idea that the train is currently finding its place 
in the political debate and in the public opinion. The choice which seems to be made – to focus 
on the existing network and on higher-speed projects – may contribute to rethink the Euro-Asian 
vision of the object “high-speed rail”. Do we attend the emergence of a new model of 
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development based on a hybrid railroad network between higher-speed lines and true high-
speed lines? 
For more than fifty years, the high-speed rail has been developed across the world. This mode 
is now completely integrated into the national transport system of countries which made the 
development of dedicated infrastructures for high-speed trains a priority. The UIC identifies 
almost 30 000 kilometers of high-speed lines in 2016, and counts 1.6 billion passengers every 
year in the world. The UIC recognizes a railway line as a true high-speed line when the 
infrastructure enables trains to circulate at least at 300 kph. The European Union puts forward 
a wider vision of HSR including trains circulating at least at 250 kph on a dedicated infrastructure 
and more than 200 kph on an improved existing infrastructure. In the United States, the 
definition of HSR is fixed by the Congress and the Federal Railroad Administration. A statutory 
definition has been elaborated according to several federal laws: 
-High Speed Rail Corridors Program (1991): « where railroads speeds of 90 miles or more per 
hour are occurring or can reasonably be expected to occur in the future » (23 U.S.C. §104d2C)); 
-High Speed Rail Assistance (1994): « reasonably expected to reach sustained speeds of more 
than 125 miles per hour » (49 U.S.C. §26105); 
-High Speed Rail Corridor Development Program (2008): « reasonably expected to reach speeds 
of at least 110 miles per hour » (49 U.S.C. §26106b(4)). 
The Federal Railroad Administration adopted in 2009 a definition based on three categories: 
emergent corridors (with maximal speed between 145 kph and 180 kph), regional corridors 
(maximal speed between 180 kph and 240 kph on dedicated lines), and Core Express corridors 
(minimal speed of 240 kph on dedicated lines). The adoption of a very wide definition of HSR is 
necessary in the United States to be able to integrate into it at least the Northeast corridor and 
some corridors identified by the “Obamarail” initiative. However, the study of these various 
projects reveals a growing diversification of the technical, political and financial arrangements 
based on three trends: the adaptation of the existing network, higher-speed rail and true HSR. 
Indeed, the true HSR model - more than 300 kph and a dedicated infrastructure - is not the 
dominant model anymore. The paradigm of speed, which has prevailed for decades in projects 
and political speeches, seems to be gradually questioned for the benefit of other key elements 
- integration of networks, financial profitability, preservation of the existing network, local 
service etc. This apparent diversification of HSR projects will be assessed thanks to an analysis 
of the situation of the United States. The scientific literature on the evolution of models of 
development of HSR, and on the lack of socioeconomic profitability of some high-speed rail 
networks is quite incomplete.  
This analysis on the imbalance of the HSR model of development – based on a scientific article 
of Pierre Zembri and Eloise Libourel (Zembri, Libourel, 2016) about a comparison between 
France and Spain – supports the hypothesis that another model of development is emerging in 
the United States. This country embodies the historical triumph and the sensational history of 
railroads, while the U.S. freight rail displays particularly solid performances and results. 
However, the United States are a young country regarding the high-speed rail. It is a vast 
territory where there are numerous opportunities to build new railway lines. Despite the deep 
crisis of passenger rail transportation since 1950-1960 and several difficulties slowing down the 
redevelopment of this mode, important projects have emerged to create a true HSR network. 
The analysis of these projects of American HSR corridors demonstrates that the object “high-
speed” is not at the core of planning documents. The main part of the HSR corridors projects 
comprises higher-speed corridors which might be upgraded to true HSR corridors, such as the 
Northeast corridor. The Californian project rests partially on the building of a new dedicated 
infrastructure but also on the use of improved existing sections. 
This submission joins essentially in two themes of the Congress: the theme 1 (HSR infrastructure 
and services evolution on a medium and long-term perspective) and the theme 17 (Case studies 
of overall social, economic, territorial, image and sustainability evaluation).  This article rests on 
three main objectives: the establishment of a geography of HSR in the United States thanks to 
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an analysis of projects and perspectives of development of this technology (1), the analysis of 
the economic model and the envisaged territorial effects of a future HSR network (2), and finally 
the identification of the characteristics of HSR model of development in the United States which 
allow to sketch an American model of high-speed rail (3). This article proposes to complete a 
still deficient scientific production on high-speed rail in the United States, and on the technical, 
institutional, economic and territorial characteristics of HSR projects. The historic initiative of 
the Obama administration contributed to revive the institutional and scientific production on 
HSR and conventional railway lines. Numerous works analyze the structural causes which explain 
the lack of HSR lines in the United States, contrary to many developed countries and emerging 
countries which conceive this technology as a way to renew passenger rail transportation 
(Lynch, 1998; Perl, 2002, 2012). Some researchers reflect upon the utility of this mode in the 
American context (Button, 2012; Lane, 2012; Levinson, 2012). Since 2010, the political, 
institutional and scientific reflections on the political blockages of the establishment of HSR 
network in this country and on the potential strategies of development have multiplied (Deakin, 
2010; Murakami and Cervero, 2010; Ashiabor and Wei, 2012; Johnson, 2012; Loukaitou-Sideris, 
2013, Kamga, 2015; Perl and Goetz, 2015; Ruggeri, 2013, 2015; Schorung, 2017). 
 
 
3. An unprecedented political commitment for the establishment of high-speed rail in the 
United States  
 
3.1. Theoretical frame: true high-speed rail or higher-speed rail?  
 
High-speed rail consists of trains circulating at a more important speed than conventional trains, 
at a higher frequency with better transport capacities (Todorovich, Schned and Lane, 2011). In 
terms of speed, the definitions diverge according to diverse institutions and countries between 
“purist” definitions and wider definitions allowing to integrate more projects and corridors. In 
the United States, this question of the definition of HSR is crucial because the federal 
government opted for a wide definition in order to consider certain rail corridors as high-speed 
corridors. Our starting assumption is to speak about “higher-speed” for corridors and projects 
in the United States.  
To understand the fundamental distinction between true high-speed rail and higher-speed, one 
can start with three institutional definitions resuming the main meanings of the object “high-
speed rail”. First of all, there are the strictest definitions from the UIC (Union Internationale des 
Chemins de fer) and the European Union. The UIC lists true high-speed railways as the ones 
circulating at speed of 250 kph and more (UIC, 2013). The European Union considers that a true 
HSR train is a train circulating at 250 kph and more on a dedicated infrastructure and also a train 
circulating at 200 kph and more on a conventional infrastructure (Peterman, Frittelli and Mallett, 
2013). In the United States, the official definition of HSR results from the Congress and the 
Federal Railroad Administration. The FRA adopted a very wide definition of HSR: “Service that is 
time-competitive with air and/or automobile travel in a given intercity corridor” (U.S. GAO, 
2009). This choice allows the FRA to include varied projects in its rail policies.  
The Federal Railroad Administration adopted in 2009 a definition based on three categories: 
Emergent Corridors (with maximal speed between 145 kph and 180 kph), Regional Corridors 
(maximal speed between 180 kph and 240 kph on dedicated lines), and Core Express Corridors 
(minimal speed of 240 kph on dedicated lines). The adoption of a very wide definition of HSR is 
necessary in the United States to be able to integrate at least the Northeast corridor and some 
corridors identified by the “Obamarail” initiative (Peterman, Frittelli and Mallett, 2013). 
Beyond these official criteria, the research on this subject agree on the EU’s definition of speed 
but remind that HSR depends on criteria other than speed (Campos & de Rus, 2009). Moshe 
Givoni and David Banister consider that the question of speed has become a fixation of rail 
policies while it might be often secondary for travelers, more interested in comfort, service 
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reliability and transport cost. Furthermore, they insist on the importance to distinguish maximal 
speed and average speed (Givoni and Banister, 2012).  
 
3.2. Breaking a long series of failures  
 
In a fiercer international competition in the 1960s, the United States reacted to the inauguration 
of the Shinkansen in Japan. The U.S. federal government launched the first studies on high-speed 
rail before most of the European countries. Nevertheless, the establishment of HSR in the United 
States has been only a succession of failures, false starts and political deadlock. 
 
Figure 1. The HSR in the United States: the federal government as a “bridgehead” 
 
 
1965-1969
•Primary commitment of the federal government: High Speed Ground Transportation (HSGT)
•1965 : High Speed Ground Transportation Act
•1969 : launch of the Metroliner in the Northeast corridor, higher-speed rail service (average 
speed of 176 kph)
1970-1979
•Rescue package of interurban rail transportation and improvement of the NEC
•1970-71 : Rail Passenger Service Act (creation of Amtrak)
•1976 : Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act : création of the NECIP (Northeast 
Corridor Improvement Project) to improve the performances of Amtrak on the Northeast 
Corridor
1980-1991
•Taking the first steps in the establishment of a HSR network in the United States
•1980-1981 : reports of Amtrak and the FRA on the "Emerging Corridors"
•1984 : Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act which initiated studies on HSR projects supported by 
the States
•1990-91 : launch of the National Maglev Initiative (NMI) with a12 million dollar budget
•1991 : ISTEA designated five HSR corridors 
1991-1997
•Designation of five HSR corridors by the FRA which paves the way to high-speed rail in the United States
•1992 : designation by the FRA of these five corridors: 
•Midwest (Chicago-Detroit-St. Louis-Milwaukee)
•Floride (Miami-Orlando-Tampa)
•Californie (San Diego-Los Angeles-Bay Area-Sacramento)
•Southeast (Charlotte-Richmond-Washington D.C.)
•Pacific Northwest (Eugene-Portland-Seattle)
•1997 : new report of the FRA on the expected economic benefits of HSR (High Speed Ground 
Transportation Commercial Feasibility Study Report)
1998-2004
•Designation of sixe other HSR corridors
•1998-1999 : TEA-21 Act which selects additional corridors: Gulf Coast, Keystone, Empire State, extension 
du corridor Southeast, extension du corridor Midwest
•2000 : U.S. DOT authorizes the extension of 4 corridors and the designation of 2 new HSR corridors:
•Northern New England (Boston-Auburn-Montreal) 
•South Central (Dallas-Fort Worth-Austin-San Antonio-Oklahoma City-Tulsa)
•2004 :  Congress (Consolidated Appropriations Act en 2005) authorizes the extension of the Northern 
New England (Boston-Springfield-Albany ; Springfield-New Haven)
•2004-2008 : no significant progress in the implementation of these HSR corridors
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Anthony Perl has traced the repeated failures of diverse HSR projects since the 1980s. The 
Californian case may be qualified as a false start. The first project prepared by the AHSRC – 
American High Speed Rail Corporation – and by the State of California, in partnership with the 
Japan National Railways, was presented in 1983. It planned a train circulating at 250 kph 
connecting Los Angeles and San Diego with a complete opening in 1990. This project was 
abandoned in November 1984 due to a lack of sufficient funds (Perl, 2002). It is necessary to 
wait for 2008 to witness California reinvesting in this HSR project. Other examples in the United 
States are truly failures which have never restarted. 
  
Figure 2. HSR projects in the United States: multiple and repeated failures 
 
 
 
 
Two main reasons explain these resounding failures: the lack of public and/or private dedicated 
funds, and the absence – or the retreat – of political support. Since 1965 and until 2008, the 
federal government has been interested in this innovative mode of transport, appearing as a 
leader and committing legislative and financial means for prospective and conceptual studies. 
However, its role is limited to the request of studies and to the designation by law of HSR 
corridors. There are actually no properly funded programs to support the building of high-speed 
lines (Lynch, 1998; Perl, 2002). This complicated situation is confirmed with the three cases of 
failures presented above: the federal level decided either to stand back, either to withdraw 
brutally making collapse the project or to commit too timidly. After this series of failures or 
Ohio
•1980 : project introduced by the 
ORTA (Ohio Rail Transportation 
Authority)
•Project carried out by the State 
alone (without Amtrak, the 
ASHSRC, or private funds)
•Abandon of the project due to 
the victory of Republicans in 
1981
Texas
•1989 : creation of the THSRA 
(Texas High Speed Rail Authority) 
by the State
•Call for projects carried out by 
the THSRA
•1992: designation of Texas TGV
•The State withdraws from the 
project. The THSRA and Texas 
TGV Consortium are alone to 
carry out this project
•1992-1993: Texas is now 
opposed to the project. The 
consortium is tending to crumble
•1995: abandon of the projet by 
the THSRA
Floride
•1984 : Florida High Speed Rail 
Transportation Act to develop a 
private project
•1991 : abandon of the project 
due to a lack of funds
•1995 : Florida develops a public-
private partnership (like in 
California) : 5 proposed projetcs
•designation of the FOX project 
(Florida Overland Express)
•2000 : creation of the Florida 
High Speed Rail Authority to 
carry out the project
•2002 : release of the first studies 
conducted by the FHSRA
•2004 : the republican governor 
Jeb Bush derails the project by 
revoking the act of 2000
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aborted attempts, the year 2008 marked a clean break in the history of HSR in the United States 
and a renewal of federal rail policies.  
 
3.3. The “Obamarail”: an ambition to form HSR corridors  
 
The renewal of the federal rail policy is based on three legislative acts voted in 2008 and 2009: 
the Rail Safety Improvement Act (2008) which increased safety requirements and modernized 
the legislation relative to railroad safety, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act 
(2008) which supported three new programs of investment for rail transportation, and the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) which dedicated eight billion dollars of the 
economic stimulus plan to HSR (U.S. DoT, 2009a, 2009b). The Congress adopted in 2010 a 2.5 
billion dollars additional budget for high-speed rail and Amtrak (Randall, Frittelli and Mallett, 
2013).  
In addition to these laws, President Barack Obama, Vice-President Joe Biden and Transport 
Secretary Ray LaHood presented in April 2009 the Obama administration’s initiative in favor of 
high-speed rail. Ten corridors – plus the Northeast corridor – were designated to receive federal 
funds (U.S. DoT, 2009b). 
 
This initiative for high-speed rail is based on two pillars: the construction of new dedicated lines 
for high-speed trains, and the improvement of existing services by an incremental approach. 
Regarding high-speed rail specifically, three project types are planned: 
 The individual projects which are subsidies to on-going projects allowing a fast stimulus 
of local economic activity; 
 The projects which are subsidies to support projects HSR corridors projects whose 
planning studies are well advanced; 
 The planning, that is the development of partnerships to envisage future HSR lines 
whose funds come from other sources that the ARRA. 
At the end of 2009, the federal administration established the structure responsible for the 
financing – High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program (HSIPR). It proposed a typology of 
projects based on speed: Core Express Corridors, Regional Corridors, and Emergent Corridors. 
Only the first category corresponds to true high-speed rail strictly speaking.  
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Figure 3. The HSR corridors funded by the HSIPRP in 2010 and 2011 
 
 
 
The “Obamarail” represents a clear break in federal rail policies, conferring a leading role to the 
federal government in the building of a new high-speed network and an improved higher-speed 
network. The initiative of B. Obama has reinvigorated the political, technical, and scientific 
reflections and debates on interurban rail transportation.  
 
 
4. The reality of the « Obamarail » initiative: a new emerging railroad geography? 
 
4.1 An assessment of the HSR corridors 
 
The initiative of the Obama administration has generated an increase of projects but it has 
concerned finally only very limited territories, identified as “relevant territories” for higher-
speed rail or true high-speed rail. Indeed, it seems unrealistic to think that HSR trains could cover 
all of the American territory and form a comprehensive network. These “relevant territories” 
match some demographic and economic criteria: high population densities, a dynamic labour 
market, congested highways and airports, and important metropolitan areas less than 800 
kilometres apart from each other.  
The leading territories are California and the Northeast States. The promising territories are the 
Midwest characterized by a hub and spokes network based on Chicago and secondary cities – 
Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Saint Louis, Detroit and Indianapolis – and the Northwest (Seattle, 
Portland). Finally, the innovative territories are Texas and Florida. These two States, which 
proposed failed public or private projects, now turn to private projects such as All Aboard 
Florida.  
 
4.2. Two HSR corridors under development: the Northeast Corridor and the California Corridor 
 
The network of the Northeast corridor is the busiest of the United States, combining numerous 
rail services. On this corridor, Amtrak operates the only higher-speed train of the country, the 
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Acela Express. This one can reach the maximal speed of 240 kph on very limited sections but it 
circulates at an average speed of 105 kph. The growth perspectives of this corridor are very 
favourable, Amtrak estimating a 60 percent increase of ridership on all Northeast rail services 
(Amtrak, 2015). The NEC has to face in the coming years a major capacity problem because of 
this projected increase of the traffic and because of too often postponed investments. These 
difficulties are aggravated by the advanced ageing of many infrastructures – some must be 
replaced.  
Since the middle of the 2000s, Amtrak has launched a profound reflection and a vast planning 
process to increase the capacities of the Northeast Corridor and to transform it into a true high-
speed rail network in the medium term. In 2010, the Northeast Corridor Infrastructure Master 
Plan is released and is the result of a collaboration between twelve Northeast States, the District 
of Columbia, Amtrak, the FRA, eight public transport agencies, and three freight companies. This 
master plan identifies about 52 billion dollars of investments required by 2030 to place this 
corridor in a good state of maintenance and repair, and to absorb the increase of interurban and 
regional traffic. The same year, Amtrak published a new major report, A Vision for High-Speed 
Rail in the Northeast Corridor. This plan designs a new 690 kilometres double-track line between 
Washington D.C. and Boston for a true HSR service – NextGen HSR. This new dedicated line is 
estimated at 117 billion dollars, for a complete opening in 2040. The recommendations of these 
two reports were integrated into one program, the Northeast Corridor Capital Investment 
Program (NECIP), intended to launch major investments to improve the existing network first 
and then to lay the foundations for the future HSR line (Amtrak, 2012).  
The NECIP confirms a double approach: to improve the existing network by an incremental 
approach and to prepare the establishment of high-speed rail. This is explained by the heavy 
financial constraints which weigh in on Amtrak. The objective is to confirm the train as a very 
competitive mode in this region because a main part of interurban travels is already made by 
train. This very ambitious program testifies of a declared willingness by Amtrak and the FRA to 
build a true HSR corridor serving as a structuring axis for the Megalopolis. However, three major 
problems remain: the commitment of public authorities, the lack of financial resources, and the 
technical complexity of this program due to the replacement of heavy infrastructures and the 
modernization of the Hudson tunnels.  
 
The Californian project represents the second laboratory of high-speed rail in the United States 
and plans to build a dedicated network for HSR trains. Since the 1990s, California has tried to 
build a high-speed rail network between Sacramento and San Diego servicing San Francisco and 
Los Angeles. In 2002, a 9.9 billion dollars loan was adopted by the legislature but this loan was 
approved six years later by referendum. The authority received the support of numerous cities, 
counties and public transport agencies (Audikana, 2012; Ruggeri, 2015a). In November, 2008, 
the loan – known as the “Proposal 1A” – was approved by Californians. This project is boosted 
by the commitment of the Obama administration. The future network will extend over more 
than 1200 kilometres between Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego, with 14 
intermediate stops (Ruggeri, 2015b). The construction in the central Valley of the new dedicated 
infrastructure has started since 2015. 
The building of this network was initially divided into five main stages (CADOT, 2013; Ruggeri, 
2015a). In February 2016, with the release of the updated financial plan of the CAHSRA, a 
consequent modification of the program was announced. Following the construction of the 
central section, the third initial phase “Bay to Basin” will become a priority. The CAHSRA 
considers that it is more urgent to build the network towards San Francisco and the Bay Region 
(CAHSRA, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
International Congress on High-speed Rail: Technologies and Long Term Impacts 
10 
 
Figure 4. The building of a new HSR corridor: the Californian project 
 
 
 
Beyond the incremental approach by successive phases from 2018 to 2040, the Californian 
project is based on a “blending strategy” to set up a “seamless” network and to assure the best 
possible interconnectivity of the various rail networks (CAHSRA, 2012). Some sections of the 
future HSR network are existing sections which need an upgrade to adapt to the technical 
constraints of higher-speed trains. This strategy reveals the financial difficulties of such a project. 
Indeed, the initial business plan of the CAHSRA planned a total 98 billion dollar investment 
program for the completion of the Phase 1 (San Francisco-Los Angeles-Anaheim). The revised 
business plan of 2012 planned a 68 billion dollar investment program. This 30 billion dollar gap 
relates to the use of an existing section between San Jose and San Francisco, instead of the 
building of new tracks and to the use of an improved Metrolink network between Los Angeles 
and Anaheim (CAHSRA, 2012; Ruggeri, 2015a). Finally, the change of priority announced in 2016 
is essentially due to financial constraints. Works towards San Francisco represent fewer 
technical and financial problems than works towards Los Angeles – because of the necessary 
crossing of the Tehachapi Mountains (CAHSRA, 2016). 
In brief, Northeast States and California are territories of advanced experiment of HSR in the 
United States, both with a mixed project of modernization of the existing network and the 
building of a new infrastructure. Some common characteristics to these two projects can be 
identified: the medium-term phasing, the financial uncertainties, the commitment of the federal 
government and States, the valuation of the future HSR corridor as a structuring axis of a 
megaregion.  
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4.3. Private projects: symbol of the failure of the Obama administration or of a recapture of 
the train by economic actors? 
 
Several projects are currently carried out by private consortiums in the United States and are 
financed only by private funds, not to depend on public programs. We can identify five main 
private projects – not at the same level of progress: the Texas Central Railway (TCR), the Midwest 
High Speed Rail Association, the All Aboard Florida project and two projects to connect Los 
Angeles and Las Vegas (Xtrain Service and XpressWest). This analysis is focused on the Floridian 
project because it’s the only one to be actually under construction in 2017.  
The All Aboard Florida project is led by Florida East Coast Industries-LLC (FECI), a large real estate 
consortium which possesses the infrastructure between Orlando and Miami. The 312 kilometres 
project is a higher-speed interurban rail service serving four cities – Miami, Fort Lauderdale, 
West Palm Beach, and Orlando – by following the existing rights-of-way of the company. A new 
section of 64 kilometres is planned to serve Orlando’s airport. According to the FECI, Miami and 
Orlando will be connected in three hours, with trains running at an average speed of 170 kph.  
 
 
Figure 5. All Aboard Florida: a new polarizing axis of Florida? 
 
 
 
This project represents an innovative model of development of a higher-speed rail service being 
carry out by a private enterprise. This private initiative can be interpreted as a way to by-pass 
political and institutional blockings – the republican governors of Florida decided to give up the 
funds of the “Obamarail” – and to mitigate the weakness of the current rail service offering. In 
order to finance this project, the FECI relies on real estate development. It offers an interesting 
strategy on how private actors may reinvest in the railway sector. In its communication, All 
Aboard Florida insists on the structuring role of this new line in a very touristic territory, allowing 
to connect and to serve the main travel destinations of Florida – Miami and West Palm Beach – 
and Orlando, capital of leisure parks. Furthermore, the company plans that the four new stations 
will be the support of vast real estate transactions particularly in Miami and Orlando. The future 
Miami Central Station will have a function of hub between interurban and urban transport 
networks and will be an element of an impressive real estate operation with several high-rise 
and luxury buildings and commercial spaces. The new stations are considered as a vector of 
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sustainability and profitability for the economic model of the future line beyond the 
architectural aspects of the buildings. Using existing infrastructure, the company proposes a 
tight timetable with the opening of the first section on October, 2017.    
These numerous projects – private or semi-private – may be considered as an additional sign of 
the renewed interest for interurban passenger rail transportation in the United States. The 
projects holders, as well as public and private actors favourable to the train, try to by-pass the 
lack of public financing by attracting private investors and by relying on the capture of real estate 
value. However, these private projects may be also interpreted as an answer to the lack of stable 
political and financial commitment of the federal government and certain States. The 
“Obamarail” initiative from 2009 to 2012 has injected 10.5 billion dollars for railroad projects 
but this sum is in the end very low regarding the needs for true HSR lines. Moreover, the 
blockings at the Congress and the strong opposition of the Republican party have instilled doubt 
about the capacity of the public actors to honour long-term commitments for transportation 
mega-projects.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
The emergence of private projects, sometimes has become real competitors of federal and state 
projects, reflects the current situation of passenger rail transportation in the United States, 
between a technological, scientific and political emulation and major financial obstacles. After a 
mattering reversal in 2008-2009, marked by the vote of several laws and the implementation of 
an innovative mode of governance resting on a collaboration between federal scale and state 
scale, railroad policies have seemed to be in slow motion since 2011. The defenders of true high-
speed or higher-speed rail projects explain that the opponents of the various projects block 
potential funds. But the report seems more pragmatic: there would be simply no fund anymore 
to be blocked, this rail policy is not a priority of federal transportation policies anymore. 
 
In view of the railroad geography inherited from the Obama administration, it would be 
excessive to conclude on a total failure. If the results of this railroad politics may seem limited, 
it is rather advisable to ask about the sustainability of this policy. It seems that the work made 
by the FRA establishes an incentive to rethink and to renew the approach to the passenger rail 
transportation. The federal state was a subdued and hesitating player for the years 1960-1970. 
Since 2009, the federal actor has reaffirmed as a pillar of the US rail sector by inaugurating a 
new partnership policy with the States. The question of its sustainability depends on the attitude 
of the new administration of President Donald Trump. The defenders of the rail hoped for a 
democrat administration, Hillary Clinton's program planned major investments for the 
transportation infrastructures. Donald Trump's victory casts a vagueness on the future transport 
policies of the federal government. Indeed, he had often denounced during his campaign the 
state of infrastructures in the United States and had proposed the launch of a massive 
investment. At this time, the Trump administration seems to sketch an ambiguous position with 
on one side a finance bill which would reduce all the investments to non-automotive transports, 
and of the other side the preparation of an investment plan of 1000 billion dollars (2/3 of this 
plan would be funded by the private sector) to modernize infrastructures and to boost certain 
railroad projects.  
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